Khartoum Agreement Central African Republic

Beyond the power-sharing agreements, the government has made progress on some provisions of the agreement, but not others. Reports indicate that work is underway to establish the prefectural committees and the technical oversight committee. The bilateral commission between the K.O. and Cameroon met in Bangui from 6 to 8 May to discuss cross-border cooperation; According to reports, a meeting of the CAR-Chad committee was scheduled for the end of the month, but has since been delayed. [fn] Interview of the Crisis Group, African Diplomat, Bangui, May 2019.Hide Footnote The government has completed its communication strategy and is broadcasting information on the agreement on national and local radio. [fn] Maintenance of the Crisis Group, head of the Ministry of Communications, Bangui, May 2019.Hide Footnote However, the training of mixed security units has been more difficult; As described above, some armed groups have not yet provided their full lists of names and some in Bangui remain skeptical of the GDR`s progress in the near future. [fn] Crisis Group interviews, civil society actors, politicians, Bangui, March and May 2019. See “DDR in CAR: the majority of armed groups file their list of fighters,” RFI, May 18, 2019.Hide Footnote Debates about the strongest and most capable of running the country have begun to lack any spirit of adaptation and power-sharing that favours the signing of the peace agreement. Political maneuvering in the capital is unlikely to help address the causes of the rebellion within the central government, which historically stem from the marginalized peripheries of the state. Further evidence of perceived disinterest in events outside Bangui has been questioned by many international observers as to why the government did not unmask a high-level delegation in an attempt to calm the escalation of violence in Birao. The recent agreement to end seven years of conflict in one of Africa`s poorest countries has largely stalled, but peace remains a possibility. After seven months, unsurprisingly, two of the three special military advisers, Mahamat al-Khatim of the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) rebel group, and Abbas Sidiki of Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R) – resigned when they discovered that the positions were empty grenades and lacked authority or funding. The third, the leader of the Union for Peace in the Centre of the World (AlDarssa), did not resign from his post, but took advantage of his status to continue the operations of his armed group, extend its territorial control and continue the arms trade.

During this period, the peace agreement was further undermined by the constant attacks on civilians and fighting between signatory groups, notably between the Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (FPRC) and the Movement of Central African Justice Liberators (MLCJ) in Vakaga Prefecture. The government`s first steps proved controversial. On 25 February, President Touad̩ra Firmin appointed Ngrebada, its Chief of Staff and Chief Negotiator in Khartoum, as Prime Minister. In exchange, on 3 March, Ngrebada appointed a new government of 37 ministers, which retained all high-level ministers (finance, foreign affairs, home affairs and justice) from the previous cabinet, offering relatively reduced positions to six armed groups Рfive ex-Seleka and one anti-Balaka. [fn] The six positions proposed were the RJ, MPC, FPRC, UPC, the four ex-Seleka groups and the two anti-Balaka Mokom and Ngaissona groups. You will find full names of armed groups in The Appendix D.Hide Footnote Unhappy on the low number and low level of positions, the ex-Seleka groups quickly rejected the new government.